Moral Argument for the Existence of God

Trilemma Version

Introduction

The moral argument for the existence of God is based on a fact that virtually everyone accepts; namely, that there are objective moral truths that other people should follow. But what makes these moral truths binding on others? There are only three options and since the first two options don’t work, some type of God must exist.

Definition of Objective and Subjective Truths

To understand the moral argument, one first needs to understand how we will define objective and subjective.

Objective truths are those truths which are grounded in a reality outside of the human mind. For example, the statement that "Mt. Everest is the tallest mountain in the world" is objectively true for a few reasons. The physical mountain (i.e. Mt. Everest), that is located in the Himalayas, has been measured against all the other mountains on planet Earth; these measurements indicate that Mt. Everest is the tallest. These facts are not simply ideas that exist in the human mind; they are realities external to the human mind.

In contrast to this, subjective truths are those truths which are grounded in one or more human minds. For example, the statement that "Chocolate ice cream is the best flavour in the whole world" is true because of what certain people think and experience in their minds.

Key Differences Between Subjective and Objective Truths

When it comes to subjective and objective truths, it's important to realize a few key things. When it comes to subjective truths, two or more people can hold contradictory ideas and both can be right. For example, one person can believe that "Chocolate ice cream is the best flavour in the whole world" and another person can disagree by insisting that "Vanilla ice cream is the best." These two statements contradict each other because there can only be one "best." However, these statements can both still be true because they are subjective and therefore relative to each person making the claim.

In contrast to subjective truths, when two people disagree about an objective matter, and they contradict each other, both of them cannot be right. If one person insists that Mt. Everest is the tallest mountain in the world, and another person insists it is not, they both can’t be right.

When it comes to objective truths, it can make sense to disagree with someone and expect him to change his mind, but when it comes to subjective truths, this simply doesn't make sense. If someone thinks that "Blue is the best colour in the whole world," and another person disagrees by claiming that "Yellow is the best," it does not make sense to think that either person is really wrong. People may jokingly disagree, but to seriously claim that another person is wrong about such an issue would demonstrate a fundamental confusion about reality. And if someone were to seriously insist that another person should change their mind on such an issue, that would just be further evidence of this confusion.

To develop the moral argument further, we also need to establish another foundation concerning moral claims.

Commonly Held Moral Claims

Everyone believes that certain moral claims are true. For example, a young lady can get upset when her boyfriend is really late for a date and especially if her boyfriend lacks any good reason for being late. This anger is based on the conviction that people should respect others by trying to be punctual. Many other examples can be given of moral claims that the vast majority of people hold to and live by. For example, the vast majority of people believe the following statements are true:

1. It's wrong to torture and kill an innocent child.

2. It's wrong to steal someone’s car.

3. It's wrong to rape a woman.

4. It's good to respect your parents.

5. It's good to be patient.

6. It's good to help someone who is in dire need.

People also hold to the truth of moral statements concerning societies in other parts of the world as well as societies that existed in the past. Here are some examples of moral claims that are fairly common, but not necessarily held by everyone:

1. Men in Saudi Arabia need to treat women better.

2. North Korean dictators should not oppress their citizens.

3. The Nazis should not have killed millions of Jews.

As previously noted, this second group of statements is not held by everyone. The Nazis didn’t think they were doing anything wrong when they killed millions of Jews. The current dictator of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, surely believes that his actions are right and good, and many people would disagree with a blanket generalisation about men in Saudi Arabia.

If you look hard enough, you can probably also find some people who would disagree with the first group of statements (i.e. 1-6). This is especially true if one considers extreme circumstances and special situations.

The point here is not to try and find any particular moral statement that every single person agrees upon. The point is simply that virtually everyone considers at least one moral claim to be true. Which one(s) they think is/are true will vary (sometimes greatly!), but virtually everyone thinks that at least one moral claim is true.

Nature of Moral Truths

All moral statements have one fundamental aspect to them; they always contain a certain sense of “should (not)” (or “ought (not)”) to them. When someone says that something is “wrong,” “bad” or “evil,” they are saying that people “should not” do those things. On the other hand, when someone says that something is “good” or “right,” they are saying that people “should” do those things.

This “should-factor” is an essential aspect of any moral truth. If someone refers to a moral truth and claims that it does not contain any should-factor, then they are no longer referring to morality. The same thing is true of synonyms like “ethics.”

Are Moral Truths Subjective?

Given the framework established above, it is now worth considering whether moral truths are objective or subjective. That is, are they true because of what we think in our minds or because of some aspect of reality outside our minds? There are only three options here.

If moral claims are true because of what is in our minds, then they are subjective. This is the first of our three options. But recall that when it comes to subjective truths, two things are true:

1. Contradictory claims can both be correct.

2. No rational person can seriously think that another person is really wrong and should change their mind.

However, these facts about subjective truths simply don’t match with what we know about the nature of morality. When it comes to moral claims, some people are very wrong and certainly should change their minds. That’s because two moral claims which clearly contradict each other cannot both be right. If someone thinks that it’s good to rape, torture and kill an innocent child, and another person thinks it’s wrong, they cannot both be right.

Everyone regards moral truths as applying to other people regardless of what those other people think. That’s why people disagree so strenuously over them, but none of that makes sense if morality is just based in our minds. It would make as much sense as claiming that someone was very wrong because he liked the colour blue more than yellow.

This conviction comes out most strongly in extreme circumstances. For example, if a psychopath is about to kill your loved ones and he claims that his actions are right, you don’t think he just has a different opinion in his mind. No, you are convinced he is wrong and should not harm your family regardless of what he thinks. This “should not” only makes sense if moral truths are grounded in some aspect of reality that is outside the mind.

Are Moral Truths Objective?

If morality is not subjective, then it must be objective. It must be based in some aspect of reality that exists outside of our minds.

So what aspect of objective reality could moral truths be grounded in? One answer is to point to the physical world which consists of things like rocks, trees, oil, oxygen, distant stars, black holes, subatomic particles and more. This is the second of the three options.

However, this option also has to be rejected because physical things do not have any moral implications for how we should live. For instance, it makes no sense to point at a tree and say that because the tree exists, therefore killing an innocent child is wrong. It also makes no sense to say that because oxygen exists (or black holes or subatomic particles), therefore people should be patient. Physical things simply do not require any moral “shoulds” or “should nots,” so this option must also be rejected.

That leads to the last, and only, other option. There must be some aspect of reality that exists outside of our minds, that is not physical, and which makes moral statements true. This third option requires that morality is objective and thereby explains why people can rationally disagree with others. It makes sense of our deeply held conviction that when it comes to morality, two contradictory claims cannot both be right; and some people are really wrong and should change their mind.

So the moral argument, as presented here, is in the form of a trilemma with the following three options. Moral truths are either:

1. Grounded in human minds.

2. Grounded in the physical world.

3. Grounded in some type of non-physical reality.

Given that the first two options do not adequately explain the nature of morality, there must be some type of non-physical reality that can be called “God.” This God is not necessarily the Christian God; however, the Christian God is certainly one viable option. Identifying who or what this non-physical reality is, is a worthy goal, but it does not determine the success or failure of the moral argument.

There are numerous objections to the moral argument which are listed below. You are invited to click on the "arrow" next to each objection to see the response that expands underneath it.

Objections

1.  Objective morality only requires recognizing the right goal: the flourishing of all conscious creatures. You don’t need God to do that.

In his book, The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris argues that God is completely unnecessary for objective morality. According to Harris, for morality to be objective, one only needs to recognize the right goal: the flourishing of all conscious creatures. With this goal firmly in place, one can, at least in theory, work out the best way to achieve that goal. Even though it might not be possible to have all the right answers at this time, Harris contends that humans can use scientific and rational means to determine the best way to achieve this goal. Over time, this research will provide us with the correct objective morality completely apart from God.*

Harris’ position sounds persuasive until you realize that his goal (the flourishing of all conscious creatures), which he regards as obvious, is not shared by everyone. Throughout history, and all throughout the world today, many other goals have been and are being pursued. These goals are based on what others regard as having ultimate value. When people see ultimate value in very different things, their moral goals also become very different. 

For example, instead of aiming to maximize the flourishing of all conscious creatures, many people think that only human beings have the greatest value. This was the conviction behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was accepted by the United Nations in 1948. This document focuses exclusively on human beings and ignores other conscious life forms, such as animals, so it rejects Harris’ goal.

Other people restrict things even further, preferring to focus on just one part of the human race. For example, White supremacists, such as the Klu Klux Klan, only value that part of the human race that has White skin. This eliminates a large portion of the human race and makes these other human beings susceptible to the whims and (many times brutal) desires of Caucasians. But even though this devalues the majority of human beings, other people think it values far too many humans. 

In the 20th century, the Nazis and the Japanese focused not on race but their respective ethnicities. For the Nazis, only White Aryans mattered, and even though Jews and Slavs were also part of the White race, they were still deemed inferior. In east Asia, the Japanese followed a similar line of thinking toward their Asian neighbours, including the Koreans and Chinese. Although Koreans and Chinese were of the same race, many Japanese people did not consider them to have the same value. This produced some of the worst atrocities in history. More than one hundred thousand innocent Chinese civilians were killed at Nanjing alone, and some six million Jews were killed in the Nazi Holocaust.

There are still other people with even more narrow goals. In sub-Saharan Africa, many people prize their own tribe more than the other tribes around them. Likewise, in the Amazon jungle, certain tribes or clans have valued their own group and engaged in cannibalism toward outsiders. Some psychopaths only value themselves and will torture others for their own personal pleasure, so Harris’ goal, based on his value judgement, is clearly just one of many goals.

The fact is, there are simply many different groups that are deemed to be of ultimate value and therefore worthy of the goal of morality. Harris might think his goal is obvious, but many people would beg to differ, and given all these goals, it’s clear that at least some of them are wrong and should be rejected. 

However, as soon as we say that some goals are wrong, we’re declaring a moral truth, and then we need to ask: What makes this moral claim true? Is it true because of what people think in their minds or because of something outside their minds? Is it subjective or objective? If it’s just true because of what people think in their minds, then it’s irrational to believe that any goal is really wrong. It’s like claiming that someone is wrong because he thinks blue is better than green. 

Therefore, there must be something outside our minds that determines which goal is the right goal, and, as noted previously, the physical world can’t provide this grounding. Physical things, like rocks and stars, simply cannot require that Black people and White people have the same value. Therefore, there must be some non-physical aspect of reality (i.e. God) that provides the objective grounding for the right goal. * Harris, S. (2012). The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. Free Press.

2. a)  Evolution explains where our morality came from, not God.

Many people are convinced that the theory of evolution explains how moral standards arose and developed over time. The late Harvard sociobiologist, E.O. Wilson, describes how this could have happened:

Imagine a Paleolithic band of five hunters. One considers breaking away from the others to look for an antelope on his own. If successful, he will gain a large quantity of meat and hide–five times as much as if he stays with the band and they are successful. But he knows from experience that his chances of success are very low, much less than the chances of the band of five working together. ln addition, whether successful alone or not, he will suffer animosity from the others for lessening their prospects. By custom the band members remain together and share equitably the animals they kill. So the hunter stays. He also observes good manners in doing so, especially if he is the one who makes the kill. Boastful pride is condemned, because it rips the delicate web of reciprocity.*

Even if something like this scenario is correct, it does nothing to alter the fact that morality must still be grounded in one of only three possible options:

1. Grounded in human minds.

2. Grounded in the physical world.

3. Grounded in some type of non-physical reality.

Therefore, given our evolutionary scenario, which of these three options is the right option? If Wilson’s scenario is correct, and evolution resulted in humans inventing morality in their minds, then that would mean morality is subjective and the first option should be accepted. But the problem with that conclusion is that it does not make sense of what we know to be true. Recall that the nature of morality is characterized by two facts:

1. Two people who clearly and unequivocally contradict each on a moral matter cannot both be right. If one person says that raping, torturing and killing an innocent child is right and another person says it’s wrong, they both cannot be right.

2. Certain moral truths apply to other people regardless of whether they agree. Some people are simply wrong about moral issues and they should change their minds.

However, if morality is grounded in human minds then it is subjective and the nature of subjective truths contradicts the nature of morality as articulated above. Two facts about subjective truths are:

1. Two people can contradict each other and both can be right. Someone can think that blue is the best colour and someone else can think that yellow is the best and both can be right.

2. It simply doesn’t make sense to say that someone is wrong about a subjective matter and should change their mind. For example, it doesn’t make sense to say that someone is wrong about their favourite colour.

Notice that the first point about the nature of morality contradicts the first point about subjective truths. Furthermore the second point about the nature of morality contradicts the second point about subjective truths, so morality cannot be grounded in human minds and the first option in our trilemma must be rejected. This only leaves the second and third option, but since the physical world has no moral implications, it too must be rejected. Therefore only the third option is left: morality is true because of the existence of some type of non-physical reality. 

Having noted this, a question remains. If evolution did not result in people inventing morality in their minds, what did happen? The answer is that through the course of evolution, human beings did not invent anything. Instead they came to realize the (already existing) moral truths that were embodied in the objective, non-physical reality. In other words, primordial humans just became aware of what was right and wrong. They did not invent anything.

The only other possibility is that the evolutionary scenario is not correct. But regardless of whether the evolutionary account is accepted or rejected, it makes no difference to the moral argument.

* Wilson, E.O. "The Biological Basis of Morality." The Atlantic April 1998: 53-70.

b) Our evolutionary past produced our genes, and these genes dictate our morality.

Genes are composed of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which is a part of the physical world, so this objection seems to be pointing to the second option in the dilemma (i.e. morality is grounded in the physical world). The problem with this option is that, as already noted above, physical things cannot have any moral implications. Trees do not require that we should respect our parents. Stones do not require that we should be patient. And no chemical or acid, whether it’s deoxyribonucleic acid or any other type of acid, can dictate how we should or should not behave. 

Genes can, however, influence and affect our behaviour, but they cannot be that aspect of reality which makes moral statements true. A helpful way of appreciating this fact is to consider a book called A Natural History of Rape, written by a biologist, Randy Thornhill, and an anthropologist, Craig T. Palmer. Thornhill and Palmer sought to explain why men rape women: they argue that rape is either a behavioral adaptation or a byproduct of adaptive traits such as sexual desire and aggressiveness. The authors anticipated that this explanation would produce an outcry because it appears to justify and condone rape, but they pointed out that this would be an example of fallacious thinking. 

Thornill and Palmer go on to say that: 

There is no connection here between what is biological or naturally selected and what is morally right or wrong… One cannot grasp the power of natural selection to “design” adaptations until one abandons both the notion that natural selection favors traits that are morally good and the notion that it favors traits that function for the good of the group.*

In other words, just because our genes, or any part of our physical bodies, can explain why we behave a particular way does not mean we should act that way. Our genes, composed of a special type of acid, do not mean that we should rape, murder or steal. Nor do they mean that we should be kind, compassionate and generous. Deoxyribonucleic acid, along with all other acids and the entire physical world, cannot mean anything about how we should behave; it can only help explain how we do behave. But morality is always about how we should or should not behave. If there is no “should-factor” then we are no longer talking about morality, so our genes cannot be that aspect of reality which makes many moral statement true.      

* Thornhill, Randy; Palmer, Craig T. (2000). A Natural History of Rape. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-20125-4.  pg. 5,6.

3.  Morality is simply relative to a particular culture or society.

The first problem with this view is that hardly anyone really believes it. It’s easy to promote this idea when thinking of trivial matters such as standards of modesty or what constitutes a polite greeting, But if moral relativism is really true, then it would imply that the worst atrocities in history, including genocides, were merely culturally situated. They were not really wrong, especially considering that the nations that carried out these atrocities often did so legally and with (tacit) approval. Was the Nazi Holocaust actually wrong in the sense that the Nazis should not have done it? Was the Japanese slaughter at Nanjing wrong? Was the Rwandan genocide, in which Hutus killed Tutsis, evil? Not if moral relativism is true.

The other problem with moral relativism becomes evident when we consider what exactly it means. There are two ways to understand it. First, it could be understood purely in descriptive terms; this means we just note that different cultures have different moral standards. This is obviously true and uncontroversial. 

However, the second way of understanding moral relativism is in prescriptive or normative terms. This goes beyond simply noting that cultures differ to saying that everyone should follow the moral claims of the nation or society they are in. However, notice that the “should” in that last sentence makes it a moral claim. If everyone should obey moral relativism, what makes that claim true? 

As presented in the first part of this essay, there are only three possible answers, and only the third option works. If you believe that everyone, or even anyone, should obey moral relativism, then that only makes sense if some type of non-physical God exists.

4. Moral absolutes can contradict each other so that disproves objective morality.

Sometimes one moral truth can conflict with another moral truth. 

If you are hiding Jews in your house and the Nazis come knocking at your door, what do you do? Do you lie to the Nazis and deny that anyone is hiding in your home? Or do you tell the truth and hand over your Jewish friends to be brutalised and killed? If you lie to protect them, you are breaking the moral imperative to always be honest. On the other hand, if you betray them, you are breaking another moral imperative to protect the innocent. Either way, you are failing to follow a moral truth. 

Sometimes it’s possible to get around dilemmas like this by finding a third option. Perhaps you tell the Nazis that “No one is hiding in any of my bedrooms” (because your Jewish friends are actually hiding in a secret room that is not a bedroom), and the Nazis might actually decide to leave. Sometimes this works, but at other times, this third option is simply impossible. You must choose to break one moral imperative or the other.

How can the moral argument be defended in light of this challenge? Resolving this issue comes from realising there is a difference between “moral absolutes” and “objective moral truths.” Morality does not necessarily have to be absolute in the sense that it must always be obeyed. If morality is objective, then one moral truth can still supersede another one in importance. 

Therefore, believing that one moral truth can supersede another does not affect the moral argument because it does not necessarily claim that morality is absolute. Someone could reject moral absolutes, or accept them, and still recognize the need for an objective, non-physical reality. Notice that regardless of whether you claim that everyone should follow moral absolutes in every situation, or whether you claim that everyone should recognize when one moral truth supersedes another, you are still insisting that people “should” behave in one way or the other. This “should” only makes sense if the third option in the trilemma is accepted. 

Deciding whether to and/or how to live out the moral truths embodied by God is a separate matter from deciding whether or not some type of God exists. The moral argument simply recognizes that moral claims apply to people whether they acknowledge them or not. Given this fact, there must be some non-physical aspect of reality that provides the objective grounding of morality.

5. If morality is objective, then what is the right moral decision in every situation? And what are the right moral standards that everyone should live by?

It’s certainly important to identify the right moral standards for us to live by. You can only be a good person if you know what standards are right and good and which are wrong and bad, but this is a different issue from what the moral argument is addressing. That is, “What is the right morality?” is different from “What exists that makes those moral standards true?” *

If morality is just based in the mind, then the right moral standards are determined by whatever a person happens to think up in their mind. This means it’s (almost) impossible for them to be wrong. Just as it's (almost) impossible for someone to be wrong about which flavour of ice cream they like best, so it’s virtually impossible for someone to be wrong about which moral standards are right. However, everyone agrees that some moral standards are wrong regardless of whether someone thinks they’re right. This means that morality must be grounded outside the mind, and since, as shown above, the physical world can’t do this, there must be a non-physical aspect of reality which does.

One way to see this is to think about the stars in outer space. Suppose that two people are having a discussion and one of them – call him Bob – says that the appearance of the stars in the night sky means they exist independently of any of our minds. The other person – call him Igor – challenges that conclusion by asking Bob the following: 

Oh yeah?! Well, if they really exist outside of our minds, then exactly how many stars are there? You don’t know, do you? And since you don’t know, that proves you’re wrong. 

Bob replies by pointing out that if the stars are just in our minds, then the number of stars is determined by whatever we think in our minds. Each of us can think of the answer ourselves and it would be impossible to be wrong. 

What Igor has failed to appreciate here is that even though it is difficult to count up all the stars in outer space, that does nothing to change the fact that the stars have a mind-independent existence. The number of stars is a very different issue from the nature of their existence. You can address the latter issue without necessarily addressing the former issue.

In like manner, one does not need to know what all the right moral standards are in order to know that they have a mind-independent existence. It’s difficult to know exactly what all the right moral standards are, but that’s a very different issue from what the moral argument focuses on.

* In philosophical terms, this objection is asking about epistemology but the moral argument is focused on ontology. 

6. You don’t need God to be a good person; there are many nice atheists in the world.

Yes, there certainly are many atheists who are nice, kind, loving, patient and generous. That’s great, but it’s also irrelevant. The moral argument does not claim that atheists are bad and theists are good. In fact, empirical research could reveal that atheists are far better or far worse than any particular religious group, and it would make no difference. 

The moral argument is about what makes any moral statement true. It is not about who is good or who is bad.  

In fact, whenever anyone recognizes that an atheist is “good,” he is indirectly stating that other people should act in the same way as the atheist. This implicit claim is actually a moral claim and any time a moral claim is made, we can ask, “What grounds that moral truth? What exists that makes it true?” As explained in the beginning, there are only three possible answers to this question and the first two answers fail. Therefore, we are left with the third option. There must be some sort of objective, non-physical reality that we can call God. 

7. People are motivated to be good by a sense of empathy as well as other factors. They don’t need God or religion to be moral.

Yes, many people are motivated to help others out of empathy, which is great! And many atheists are empathetic and kind toward other people. That’s also very good and should be encouraged, but the moral argument is not about what motivates anyone. It’s about what grounds the truth of moral statements. Are these moral statements grounded in a reality inside the mind or outside the mind? They must be grounded outside the mind, and so there must be some objective, non-physical aspect of reality that makes morality true. This is the only possible answer because physical things do not have any moral implications.

We can also note that human beings have plenty of different motivations for their actions. Some people do what is right and have pure motivations. Others do what is right but have impure motivations. These latter people might help others but only because they are hoping to get money, sex, public recognition, etc. Many people act out of a combination of pure and impure desires. There are a whole range of motivations out there.

Given all these motivations, some are clearly right and some are wrong. Some are motivations that people should act on, and some are motivations that people should not act on. Any true statement that distinguishes which motivations are good and which are bad, is a moral truth, and of course, we can now go back to the trilemma and ask what is this moral truth grounded in? 

Only the existence of an objective, non-physical reality can make sense of the fact that we should act on some motivations and should not act on other motivations.  

8. Animals also display moral behaviour but they don’t need God!

It’s true that some animals act in ways that, for example, demonstrate empathy or a sense of justice. However, noting this fact could actually expand the strength of the moral argument rather than weaken it.

There are at least two ways of interpreting the (apparently) moral behaviour of animals. The first interpretation says that it is good for animals to act virtuously, and that they should live in accordance with certain moral truths, but that just leads back to the original trilemma. Are these moral truths based in the mind, the physical world, or some non-physical reality? If we conclude that animals should live in accordance with these truths – regardless of whether they actually do – then only some non-physical reality can require this.

On the other hand, the (apparently) moral behaviour of animals can be interpreted in another way. One could interpret it as animals displaying moral-like behaviour but without concluding that they should act in any particular way. If this is the case, then it does nothing to affect the moral argument since we still know that humans should behave in accordance with moral truths whether or not they actually do act in these ways. Therefore, these objective moral truths require that some objective, non-physical aspect of reality must exist.   

*  “Two Monkeys Were Paid Unequally: Excerpt from Frans de Waal's TED Talk” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=meiU6TxysC   “Do Animals Feel Empathy? | Animal Einsteins | BBC Earth”:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXUk2ylJ5YI

9. You’ve given no real evidence whatsoever to support your claim that morality is objective. You argue that many people agree with your view, but that’s worthless in terms of evidence. Many people “feel” lots of things that turn out to be completely wrong.

It’s true that a view held by many people could be completely wrong; many people do feel or think lots of things that turn out to be completely misguided.  

However, sometimes it does make sense to point out that a view is widely held. To illustrate, suppose someone argued that the sun did not exist. How would you respond to such a person? You could tell them to just look at the sky and see that it exists, but suppose they denied they could see it. What would you say then? In this situation, your interlocutor is either in denial, or you are suffering from some sort of perpetual hallucination. Which is it? One way to respond is to appeal to what others are experiencing. If the vast majority of other people can also see the sun – most easily at sunrise and sunset – then it’s much more likely that your interlocutor is in denial rather than that you are suffering from a hallucination. Hence, in some situations it makes sense to appeal to what the vast majority of people are experiencing or sensing.

When it comes to the moral argument, virtually everyone thinks that at least some moral truths apply to other people regardless of whether those other people agree. For example, the vast majority would say that it’s objectively wrong to rape a child even if the rapist thinks it’s right. A very small number of people might disagree – perhaps rapists and sadistic pedophiles – but even they will probably be convinced that at least one moral truth applies to other people regardless whether those other people agree. The fact that virtually everyone holds this view can be seen by how humans think and behave in everyday life. Every day, we expect other people to abide by certain moral “shoulds” and “should nots” regardless of whether those other people think so. Either the vast majority of us are right about the objective nature of morality, or we are suffering from some sort of massive, ongoing “moral hallucination.” 

Strictly speaking, it is possible that humanity has been deceived by this “moral hallucination,” but that doesn’t mean it’s the most probable explanation. It’s also possible that virtually everyone is deceived about the existence of the sun, but that doesn’t mean it’s the most probable explanation. We need to consider what is more likely. Are the vast majority of people, throughout all of human history, suffering from a perpetual moral hallucination? Or is the person who thinks there is “no real evidence whatsoever to support [the] claim that morality is objective” simply in denial about what everyone knows to be true?   

If someone insists on the former option – that humanity has been plagued by a massive moral hallucination – there is no way to absolutely prove they are wrong. Those who choose this option seem to be claiming that the first of the three options in the trilemma – that morality is subjective – is correct. However, those who make this choice should ask themselves the following questions: Do I really believe that the morality of raping, torturing and killing a child is up to everyone to decide for themselves? Am I really willing to accept that if someone thinks it’s good to torture an innocent child, that person’s view is, objectively speaking, no better or worse than any other person’s view? Do I really believe this, or do I just adopt this position because, for whatever reason, I want to avoid concluding that God exists?

10. How can a physical person, with just a physical body, sense these non-physical truths? Are you claiming that people have some sort of spooky “sixth sense” to detect moral “shoulds” and “should nots”? What evidence do you have for this?

Before considering whether people are just physical bodies or not, it's important to keep in mind that virtually everyone senses that morality is objective. Of course, there’s always a chance – even if it is just a very small chance – that they could be wrong about this. Strictly speaking, it’s possible to be wrong about almost anything, but just because people could be wrong about something does not necessarily mean they are. If you reject the idea that morality is objective then nothing else that follows from the “morality is objective” argument will be plausible or acceptable to you. However, if you think morality is objective, then it makes sense to ask how people can know these non-physical “shoulds” and “should nots.”  

There are only two possibilities here: either human beings are entirely physical, or they have some non-physical aspect to them. If humans are simply physical beings composed of chemicals and physical processes, then it is difficult to understand how they could sense a non-physical reality. Therefore, the more plausible alternative is to conclude that humans are not simply physical, that they have a non-physical aspect to them. This non-physical aspect can be called a “soul,” or a “spirit,” or be given some other name.

The idea of a soul is often scoffed at by those committed to physicalism or naturalism, which is the view that only the physical world or natural world exists. But the idea of a soul, or a spirit, is something that is and has been defended and articulated by professional philosophers in a very sophisticated manner.* Furthermore, readers may find it surprising to learn that many philosophers, committed to naturalism, acknowledge they are very far from being able to account for human consciousness in naturalistic terms.

In the end though, this objection does not need to be answered in order for the moral argument to be sound. It is simply a secondary issue that does not need to be addressed but could be answered in different ways. A good way to appreciate this point is by considering Isaac Newton’s response to those who objected to his theory of gravity. When Newton proposed his theory in the Principia, published in 1687, one of the chief objections to it was “How can celestial bodies exert a force on each other (i.e. gravity) through the vast distances of outer space? What allows them to interact with each other when they are not actually touching each other?”

Newton responded by stating in Latin “Hypotheses non fingo” which means “I feign no hypotheses.” In other words, Newton did not give an answer; he did not need to. If his law of universal gravitation was correct, then different answers could be considered, but determining which one was right was not necessary for his theory to be correct.**

In like manner, if the moral argument works, then different answers could be considered in respect to how human beings are able to know non-physical moral truths, but one does not need to answer this question in order to accept the conclusion of the moral argument.   

* For a sophisticated and comprehensive defence of the soul, see The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism, by Brandon Rickabaugh & J. P. Moreland. November 7, 2023 https://www.amazon.com/Substance-Consciousness-Comprehensive-Defense-Contemporary/dp/1394195478

** For more about Newton and his theory of gravity and his use of the expression “Hypotheses non fingo” see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-philosophy/

11. The moral argument doesn’t prove the existence of the Christian God.

This objection is correct, but the moral argument, as presented above, acknowledges this. The argument does not claim that it’s trying to establish the existence of the Christian God. It only seeks to establish the existence of some type of non-physical reality which may, or may not, be the Christian God. Who (or what) this non-physical reality is, is a secondary issue. It’s certainly worth considering the identity of this being, but whether one answers this question, or even whether it’s possible to answer it, is irrelevant to the success of the argument.

12. The Bible has a lot of bad morality in it.

The moral argument does not claim that the Bible has perfect morality in it, or that it is any sort of divinely inspired book. In fact, it makes no claims about Christianity at all. It simply argues for the existence of a non-physical reality. 

On the other hand, if one accepts the conclusion of the argument, that the non-physical reality actually exists, then it’s certainly worth considering the identity of this non-physical being, so the following points are some things to keep in mind when considering the Christian God and the book he has been said to inspire:    

First, a religious text could describe a particular moral atrocity, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it is endorsing it. The book could simply state that the events occurred and also assume that the reader knows the behaviour is wrong; perhaps because the behaviour is condemned in other parts of the book.

Second, there may be other factors that aren’t immediately apparent to the reader and which would change how events in a book are understood. This additional information may reveal that the (apparent) atrocity they are reading about is actually not evil but rather morally neutral or perhaps even good. Some situations are complex and an initial, cursory reading can leave one with the wrong impression. This is why criminal defendants are tried in a court of law before a jury rather than in the court of public opinion. Juries are required to sit in a courtroom and hear all the relevant information before coming to a conclusion. In contrast, the general public often just hears bits and pieces of information. When evaluating a religious text, it's important to consider all the relevant information before coming to a conclusion. 

Third, one’s own cultural and societal conditioning may distort one's evaluation. Consider the fact that societies all throughout history, and all throughout the world today, have different ideas about what is right and wrong. Each society thinks their view is correct and the others are in error, but given the contradictions between these societies, many of them must be wrong. What are the chances that your society just happened to get everything right? Isn’t it at least a little arrogant to think that, of all the societies that have ever existed, your society is the one that just happened to get everything correct? Isn’t it far more likely that your society is wrong on at least some issues? And since you have been shaped by the society you live in, your views are most likely wrong in at least some respects. A religious text may actually be right on some issue(s), but that may be impossible for someone to see because of how his or her society has skewed their moral vision.       

Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that this objection presupposes the mind-independent nature of morality. That is, if one claims that the Bible is wrong regardless of what anyone else thinks, then what reality, outside of our minds, makes that true? Only a non-physical reality can require that the events of the Bible are wrong and should be different. Therefore this objection actually presupposes the conclusion of the moral argument.           

13. a) The moral argument has been refuted by the Euthyphro dilemma.

This objection appeals to the Euthyphro dilemma which is taken from ancient Greek philosophy and has been reformulated to apply to the moral argument. In order to understand the best response to it, we need to spend a little time understanding what the objection is all about. 

Note: To make things easier to understand, the explanation of the dilemma (below) is indented and italicized to distinguish between it and the subsequent response to it.

So what is the Euthyphro dilemma? 

The Euthyphro dilemma arises from asking the following question: On what basis does God declare his moral commands? That is, why does God issue the commands that he does? There seem to be two possible options here. 

The first option is to say that God just arbitrarily decides what is right and wrong. This means there is no real reason why God commands what he commands; he just does. If this was the case, he could have said that rape and murder were good while also declaring that kindness and compassion were evil. The problem with this option is that it does not match our intuitive sense of the nature of morality. That is, not even God could just declare rape and murder to be good, so even if God commanded us to rape and murder, they would still be wrong. Therefore, if God did exist, his moral commands could not simply be based on arbitrary decisions.

The second option is to say that God is not arbitrary in his commands and that there is actually some reason why God issues the commands that he does. God could have various different reasons and one possible reason is that humans simply have inherent value; therefore, acts such as murder and rape, are wrong. Other reasons could also be given, but regardless of what reason is given, it ultimately renders God superfluous (i.e. unnecessary) because morality would be grounded in that reason rather than in God.

Therefore, if God is superfluous then the whole moral argument collapses. God is not necessary for objective morality to exist.

So what is the solution to this dilemma? What response can be given to the Euthyphro dilemma that keeps the moral argument intact?

Theist philosophers have actually been offering a solution for quite a while even though many atheists, including those who are professional philosophers, are often ignorant of it. The solution is to reject both of the two options presented above and point to a third option. 

The third option is that God does not issue commands arbitrarily, nor does he issue commands based on some reason that is external to him; instead, his moral decrees are based on his perfectly good nature. What is God’s “nature”? In crude terms, it’s what he is “made of.” God’s nature is perfectly good, and he is this way necessarily. That means he must be this way, and that it is impossible for him to be any other way. 

God’s commands are declared on the basis of his perfectly good and unchanging nature. Therefore they are not arbitrary, nor are they based on some reason that is external to him. Hence, the dilemma disappears. 

b) If there are certain things that are impossible for God, then he cannot be the Christian God because that God can do anything. He is absolutely omnipotent.

The idea that the Christian God can do absolutely anything is incorrect. In fact, the Bible rejects such an idea. In the biblical book of Hebrews, chapter 6, verse 18, it says that it is impossible for God to lie. 

You might ask, “How can this be? How can there be something that is impossible for God?” 

Christian theologians have long understood that God has a perfectly good nature which means it is impossible for him to do anything wrong (i.e. sin). This doctrine is called impeccability and it means that God’s power is limited in this sense.

However, be sure to remember that the moral argument doesn’t try to establish the identity of the objective, non-physical reality, so the point of this response is to just explain that if someone wants to take the next step and consider the identity of the non-physical reality, then the Christian God should not be excluded from the range of possibilities.

c) If God’s nature defines objective morality then are his properties good because he possesses them, or does he possess them because they are good?

This objection is sometimes presented as a follow-up to the solution presented in 13a above. It presents a subsequent dilemma to the Euthyphro dilemma. The idea behind it is to ask whether God’s properties (i.e. qualities), such as kindness, justice, mercy, love and compassion, are good because God possesses them, or are these qualities good independently of God? 

Note: To make things easier to understand, the explanation of this new dilemma is indented and italicized to distinguish between it and the subsequent response to it.

As with the Euthyphro dilemma, there are two “horns” (i.e. options) to this new dilemma. The first “horn” is that God’s properties, such as kindness and justice, are good independent of God. If that is the case, and if these qualities are independently good, then God again becomes superfluous (i.e. unnecessary) because God is not the ultimate definition of good; instead his properties are.

On the other hand, the second “horn” is to say these properties are good, not in and of themselves, but because God possesses them. However, this makes “goodness” a meaningless term. What does it even mean to say that God is good independent of any qualities such as kindness, gentleness, etc? In effect, this option “strips God’s nature of any features that would make His goodness intelligible.” *

The answer to this objection is to accept the second horn of the dilemma - God’s properties are good because he possesses them. Some things cannot be reduced to other things and are simply brute facts. God’s goodness is a brute fact. This means that God’s goodness cannot be explained in terms of some deeper or more fundamental truth.**

The atheist might find this meaningless but that simply demonstrates a difficulty that the atheist has with recognizing the nature of ultimate goodness. Furthermore, even though God’s qualities of kindness, gentleness, etc. do not make God good, his goodness can still be understood by considering these qualities.***

It’s worth noting that atheists also tend to point to an ultimate good as a brute fact. For example, if an atheist thinks that the flourishing of all conscious creatures is the ultimate good, then someone could ask “What makes that good?” The atheist is likely to respond by saying, “It just is and if you don’t understand why, then that’s a problem with you.” In like manner, the theist points to God as the ultimate good and responds by saying, “It/he/she just is.”

At the same time, it’s worth noting that there are some key deficiencies to pointing to anything other than God as the ultimate good. See the response to objection 1 for more on this. 

* For a more thorough explanation of this objection, see “Can God’s Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro?” By Jeremy Koons, European Journal For Philosophy of Religion 4/1 (Spring 2012), pp. 177https://philarchive.org/archive/KOOCGG

** To say that God’s goodness is a brute fact does not mean that his entire existence is a brute fact.

*** For more on this, see:

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/reasonable-faith-podcast/the-euthyphro-dilemma-once-again#_ftn3

14. The identity of the “objective, non-physical reality” cannot be anything like “God” because part of the definition of God is that he/she is conscious and therefore has a mind, but if the “non-physical reality” has a mind, then the moral truths would be in his/her/its mind. This would then present the same problems associated with grounding moral truths in human minds. 

It’s first worth noting that the moral argument, as presented here in the trilemma version, only argues for the existence of an objective, non-physical reality; therefore this aspect of reality does not necessarily need to have a mind. (See objection 15 for more on this.) However, it can be conceded that if the non-physical aspect of reality is “mindless,” it probably should not be referred to as “God,” so is there any way to defend the use of the word “God”? Yes, there is.  

God is completely different from us and even though our minds do not require that anyone “should” do anything, God’s mind, which cannot be separated from his nature/essence, does require these moral “shoulds.” Therefore, the nature of God’s mind solves the problem that is lacking when someone tries to ground morality in human minds. 

15.  Objective morality can be explained in terms of Platonic forms.

What are “Platonic Forms”? 

To put it simply, this objection argues that “goodness” exists as a non-physical entity that isn’t connected to any type of God, gods, angels, etc. You might ask, “Where does it exist?” And according to this idea, it doesn’t exist anywhere, at least nowhere in our space and time. To be more exact, someone who thinks of “goodness” as a Platonic Form would probably think that different aspects of goodness, such as gentleness, kindness, mercy, etc. each have their own non-physical Form. You might think of these Forms as existing in some type of “heaven” where they just “float” around, although that’s a very crude way of putting it. The whole idea of Forms might seem very strange, but keep in mind that the idea of God is something like a Form in that he also exists outside space and time.*    

So what can be said in response to this objection?

The moral argument, as presented here, only seeks to establish the existence of an objective non-physical aspect of reality, and since Platonic Forms are objective and non-physical, they do not pose a problem for the argument. In fact, by pointing to Forms, this objection actually concedes that the argument is successful.

However, someone could object that if these Forms really do exist, and they explain how moral statements can be objectively true, then it would be inappropriate to call them anything like “God.” Since God is normally understood to have a mind with intentions, desires and purposes; and since Forms do not have these, they should not be called “God.” 

What can be said in response to this? Should we use the word “God” to describe the non-physical aspect of reality? Is there any reason to think that the non-physical reality has desires or purposes? The answer is yes because another argument can be constructed that is parallel to the moral argument. This argument is based not on objective morality but on an objective purpose to life. 

Consider a teenage girl who is sixteen years old. Her boyfriend just broke up with her, and she is completely distraught. She decides that her subjective purpose in life is to live until she is sixteen years old and then commit suicide. This teenage girl happens to be your daughter and after you go to sleep tonight, she plans to end her life.

The vast majority of people would sense that this girl’s choice is somehow wrong or incorrect and that she should not commit suicide. As a result, they would probably try to persuade her not to take her own life, but then we can ask, what is this “should not” grounded in? What exists that makes her choice “wrong” or “incorrect”? 

As with the moral argument, there are only three options here. The first option is that this “should” is subjective and therefore based in our minds, but if that is the case, then this “should” does not make sense because subjective beliefs do not have these types of implications. To say the girl should not commit suicide is like saying she should not prefer the colour yellow over blue. Just because you prefer one colour over another does not mean that anyone else “should.” 

In like manner, if “should” is just subjective and consequently based in our minds, then just because you prefer that she continues living does not mean she should. You might like the idea of her continuing to live, but that does not mean she “should.” The only way to make sense of this “should” is if there is some objective basis to it. In other words, there has to be some aspect of reality that exists outside of our minds which requires that some purposes in life are wrong and should not be pursued.

So what exists outside of our minds? The second option in this trilemma is the physical world. However, the physical world has no implications for how we should live. Rocks, trees, stars, oxygen and subatomic particles cannot require that one purpose is any better or worse than any other. 

So then, what is left? The only other option is that there is some objective aspect of reality that is non-physical and which “necessitates” that some purposes are wrong. And if it necessitates that some purposes are wrong, then it must also necessitate that some purposes are right. Therefore, this non-physical reality must have a purpose(s) for our lives because that is the only way that certain purposes, such as the one held by a suicidal sixteen year old girl, could be wrong. 

Now we can further enquire into the best label or name for this non-physical reality. If this non-physical reality necessitates that not only are certain types of behaviour right or wrong, but also that certain life-purposes are either right or wrong, it means that the non-physical reality must be more than just Platonic Forms. That’s because Platonic Forms cannot, by definition, have any sort of purpose for us. Purposes can only come from minds. Therefore the non-physical reality should be labelled “God” rather than simply “Forms” because God has a mind and can intend a purpose for us. Platonic Forms simply cannot do this.

* To understand Plato’s theory of Forms in more detail, see this article: https://www.thecollector.com/what-is-plato-theory-of-forms/    

16.  Morality is just subjective because there are no “shoulds” or “should nots” that apply to all people regardless of what they think.

In this author’s experience, when atheists encounter the moral argument for God, they frequently criticize it with the objections that are found toward the beginning of the list presented above. However, when they realize that those objections do not work, they finally conclude that morality must be subjective and so choose the first of the three options in the trilemma. As a result, although this issue was, to some degree, already addressed in objection 9, it is worth returning to it and addressing it once more.

The one positive thing that can be said about this objection is that the person who makes it no longer misunderstands the moral argument, nor are they appealing to irrelevant issues. However, the chief problem with this objection is that no one really lives their life in accordance with this view, and it’s our everyday lives which show what we really believe. Someone may claim that all moral truths are merely subjective, but they betray this claim whenever they experience moral outrage and think someone else should think or behave differently. For example, if an atheist receives a failing grade on her high school essay, and the teacher tells her that she failed because of the colour of her skin, or the colour of her eyes, or her choice of clothes, the student doesn’t simply tell herself that morality is subjective and accept the failing grade. No! She protests the decision because she thinks her teacher should behave in accordance with objective principles of fairness and equality.

The philosopher Michael Ruse also demonstrates this inconsistency. On one hand, he argues that morality is just a set of subjective beliefs that humans have adopted as a result of their evolutionary past. Ruse states the following:

Morality is just a matter of emotions, like liking ice cream and sex and hating toothache [sic]… morality has to come across as something that is more than emotion. It has to appear to be objective, even though really it is subjective… morality is an illusion put in place by your genes to make you a social cooperator…*

Ruse’s conclusion is consistent with his atheistic view, but he betrays his conclusion when he considers the horrendous evil of child rape. He writes, “The man who says it is morally acceptable to rape little children is just as mistaken as the man who says 2+2 =5.”** How can Ruse say this? If morality is really subjective and simply “appears” to be objective, then child rape cannot objectively be wrong. Someone like Ruse cannot consistently claim that morality is both subjective and objective. Therefore, Ruse must be wrong. The nature of reality simply doesn't allow for two contradictory claims to be true.

The reason Ruse makes such inconsistent claims is because, on one hand, he knows that certain acts are objectively wrong. At the same time, he does not want to accept the existence of any type of God. Of course, Ruse would most likely disagree with this and argue that the inconsistency is due to his genetic programming. As he puts it, “You are still a human with your gene-based psychology working flat out to make you think you should be moral.”* However, if Ruse chose to, he could easily reject his “gene-based psychology” and be consistent.

Ruse prizes logical consistency in almost every other area of his life but rejects it here. Why? The reason is because Ruse, along with everyone else, knows that morality is objective, but he simply does not want to accept the fact that any type of God exists. 

*   "God is dead. Long live morality” by Michael Ruse    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/15/morality-evolution-philosophy

** Ruse, Michael. Darwinism Defended. Addison-Wesley, 1982. Print., 275